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This article builds on ideas presented in Klein (2015c) concerning the importance of a
more nuanced, conceptually rigorous approach to the scientific understanding and use
of the construct Memory. I first summarize my model, taking care to situate discussion
within the terminological practices of contemporary philosophy of mind. I then eluci-
date the implications of the model for a particular operation of mind—the manner in
which content presented to consciousness realizes its particular phenomenological
character (i.e., mode of presentation). Finally, I discuss how the model offers a
reconceptualization of the technical language used by psychologists and neuroscientists
to formulate and test ideas about memory.
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Among the great primordial concepts of psychology,
few are so badly abused and poorly understood today
as is “memory.” It is the word “memory” which is in
this deplorable condition, not so much our knowledge
of the realities to which the term has been applied,
though to be sure there are many subtleties in these
phenomena which still elude us and will continue to do
so until the language in which we think about them is
rehabilitated. In our technical and quasi-technical us-
age of “memory” and such related expressions as “re-
membering,” “memories,” “memory trace,” “recall,”
“retention,” “learning,” and “information storage,” a
number of fundamental distinctions and not-so-
fundamental metaphors have become jumbled together
in a monstrous snarl of ambiguity and confusion. (Ro-
zeboom, 1965, p. 329; emphasis original)
The “ambiguity and confusion” that compro-
mise our understanding of the construct Mem-
ory is a specific instance of a more general
concern about the underdevelopment of theory
in psychological science (e.g., Klein, 2014c). A
frequently invoked explanation is that psychol-
ogy is a young science and thus prone to suffer
the unavoidable consequences of youthful folly.
This mea culpa is featured in the introductory
chapter of many psychology textbooks.
However, as the following quotes suggest, a
“growing-pains” account is not particularly
compelling.
The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to
be explained by its being a “young science”; its state is
not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its
beginnings . . . For in psychology, there are experi-
mental methods and conceptual confusion. The exis-
tence of the experimental method makes us think that
we have the means of getting rid of the problems which
trouble us; but problem and method pass one another
by (Wittgenstein, 1953/2009, “A Fragment XIV,” p.
371).
Psychological metatheory has remained seriously un-
derdeveloped . . . a psychologist is likely to appeal his
decisions about research strategies directly to general
methodological principles to an extent to which a phys-
icist or chemist does not . . . a consequence of the
unsettled state of psychological metatheory is thus that
schools of psychology are distinguished as much by
the kinds of experiments that their adherents typically
perform as by the theories they espouse. (Fodor, 1968,
pp. xiv–xv)
Additional examples of a similar nature can
be cited. But I think enough has been said to
show that we need to search for causes far more
nuanced than the benevolent condescension of
youthful indiscretion to explain the “confusion
and ambiguity” afflicting theory in psychologi-
cal science. In the next section I discuss a few
well-known offenders. For more comprehensive
accounts, see Danziger (1997) and Klein
(2014c, 2015c, 2016b).
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Identifying the Problems
Psychologists studying mental constructs of-
ten fail to separate its sense (the manner in
which one conceives its denotation) from its
reference (the object the term means or indi-
cates; e.g., Frege, 1948). This conflation is ex-
emplified by operationalism—an approach to
theory building whose foundations trace to the
logical positivist movement of the early-to-mid-
20th century. The essential idea is that the
meaning of a construct (i.e., an explanatory
variable that is not directly observable) is fully
realized by the observable outcomes of the
methods used in its measurement. Because the
outcomes of measurement are considered both
necessary and sufficient for understanding the
construct under scrutiny, construct and mea-
surement are treated as coterminous.
Consider the construct Memory. Because
memory is “hidden inside the person,” investi-
gators rely on the outcomes of memory tests—
which are assumed to be observable expressions
of an unobservable entity—to detect and assess
memory’s properties and functions. The con-
struct acquires its meaning (sense) from the
operations (reference) used to elicit its behavior.
Memory is what memory tests measure.
Although operationalism—in virtue of link-
ing an abstract construct with observable out-
comes—initially appeared to confer scientific
respectability on theory construction, it now
almost universally is seen as irreconcilable with
scientific theory and practice (e.g., Bickhard,
2001; Green, 1992; Horst, 2007). Among the
reasons is its inherent circularity. The mantra
that “memory is what memory tests measure”
begs the question by assuming what it is trying
to prove (i.e., the claim that behavior elicited by
Test X is a manifestation of memory rests on the
presumption that performance on Test X is un-
derwritten by memory).
In addition, although an act of measurement
can establish a specific reference for a construct,
it cannot establish its sense (e.g., Horst, 2007;
Klee, 1997). By failing to respect the conceptual
distinction between sense and reference, the
construct is fallaciously viewed as coextensive
with the operations used in its measurement.
Despite these concerns (there are others; e.g.,
Bickhard, 2001), operationalism continues to
have considerable influence on method and the-
ory in psychological science (e.g., Green, 1992;
Klee, 1997). Indeed, psychology is considered
unique among the sciences in the extent to
which methodological sophistication has pre-
ceded and outpaced substantive treatment of
issues investigated by those methods (e.g.,
Koch & Leary, 1992).
The scientific credibility of the construct
Memory is also compromised by an uninten-
tional by-product of historical circumstance.
Unlike many of the constructs used in the phys-
ical sciences (e.g., electron, covalent bond, in-
ertial mass, time dilation, dark matter), mental
construct terms (e.g., memory, self, mind, intel-
ligence, imagination, belief, attitudes) were of-
ten part of the vernacular long before anyone
thought to use them to identify objects of em-
pirical interest. In consequence, theories of
memory interweave folk-psychological presup-
positions about familiar objects with theoreti-
cally sanctioned propositions (e.g., Klein,
2016b). And because scientific presuppositions
are seldom subject to critical analysis (e.g., Re-
scher, 1984), they are largely immune to refu-
tation. In this way, a host of unexamined pre-
sumptions have been woven tightly into the
fabric of contemporary memory theory (for a
discussion, see Klein, 2013a, 2015c).
Although such issues may be of little concern
to the lay person, it is essential that academics
provide carefully reasoned arguments in sup-
port of their premises and the conclusions they
sanction. The only justifiable way to employ a
construct as an object of scientific inquiry is to
do so critically. A conceptually nuanced exam-
ination of the linguistic conventions and proba-
tive criteria we use to think about memory and
its cognates (e.g., remembering, retention) is the
surest path to a genuine understanding of what
memory is and what is involved in its acquisi-
tion, retention, and presentation.
Methodological Sophistication, Conceptual
Underdevelopment
Psychology is awash in data. What is often
missing are well-specified theories linking
physical observables to abstract constructs (e.g.,
Danziger, 1997; Klein, 2014c; Margenau, 1950;
Torgerson, 1958). To redress this imbalance,
practitioners need to pay greater attention to the
conceptual clarity of their constructs prior to
pushing them into investigative service. To do
otherwise is to put the cart before the horse—
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placing uncertain limits on the extent to which
we can trust the conclusions we draw from our
empirical efforts to reflect nature as it exists
independent of those efforts.1
These concerns clearly apply to the scientific
treatment of “memory.” As Tulving (2007) la-
mented, the construct too often is inseparable
from the specific tasks used in its investigation.
Unless armed in advance with a conceptually
coherent, though temporally provisional (see
Footnote 1), sense of what memory consists in,
we have no logically sanctioned way to assess
whether the data we collect are commensurate
with, antithetical to, or independent of the con-
struct being investigated (e.g., Klein, 2014c).
A Diagnosis of Contemporary Memory
Research and a Proposal for
Its Rehabilitation
In Klein (2015c), I offered a detailed analysis
of the current sense of the construct Memory. In
this section and the next, I present a summary of
my conclusions. Although a summary, to be
fully be appreciated, should not be considered
in isolation from the arguments that served as its
formative background, presenting a summation
unfettered by the evidence martialed in its sup-
port accents key points without risk of their
being swallowed by that background. In what
follows, I adopt the latter approach. Those in-
terested in evidence and argument are referred
to Klein (2015c; see also Klein, 2013a, 2014a,
2016a).
The Encoding/Storage/Retrieval Definition
in Memory Research: Explaining too Little
and Explaining too Much
But not until we have learned how to think effectively
about the formal structure of psychological processes
will we be able to pursue the more provocative leads
which have been appearing in contemporary research
or to attain any genuine understanding of the phenom-
ena to which the concepts of common-sense mentalis-
tic psychology are dedicated. (Rozeboom, 1965, p.
367)
Most theorists define the construct Memory
in an overly general way: Memory is a system
designed by natural selection to enable the en-
coding, storage, and retrieval of information
encountered in one’s past (for reviews, see
Klein, 2013b, 2015c)2,3. Although this is un-
questionably true, it is far too coarse to be a
helpful guide to research or theory. If one sub-
scribes to the principle that things do not pop
into existence ex nihilo, then, of logical neces-
sity, our mental construct terms—for example,
planning, judging, categorizing, remembering,
deciding, faith, believing, imagining, desiring,
intending, thinking—refer to “something” that
must have come from “somewhere” (i.e., they
have a causal history)4. And because that
“somewhere” makes up one’s personally expe-
rienced past, with the exception of sensation,
perception, and genetically programmed acts,
the encoding/storage/retrieval definition has the
consequence of rendering virtually every mental
state a form of memory.
Explaining too little. A well-specified the-
ory of memory certainly needs to include dis-
cussion of the preconditions that serve as its
causal history. But unless one can demonstrate
that (a) characteristics of the preconditions are
present in the end product (e.g., the experience
of memory) and (b) characteristics not present
1 This is not to imply that a construct’s sense and refer-
ence must be set in stone prior to using it. Constructs are not
static. They grow and flourish, or are cast aside, as new data
confirm or disconfirm their hypothesized properties and
features (e.g., Kuhn, 1962; Ladyman, 2002; Popper, 1963/
2004; Trusted, 1987).
2 Support for the contention that encoding/storage/
retrieval is widely embraced as the necessary and sufficient
criterion for a mental event to be afforded memorial status
is presented in Klein (2015c). The unquestioning accep-
tance of this three-pronged definition was put in bold relief
at a recent meeting of world leaders on the cellular mech-
anisms of memory. Attendees gathered to share their views
on what memory is—that is, “where and how memory
engrams are stored, consolidated, and retrieved” (Poo et al.,
2016, p. 1).
3 Numerous theories of memory have been fashioned
specifically to accommodate data collected from the defini-
tion’s bookends—encoding and retrieval (e.g., Atkinson &
Shiffrin, 1968; Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Schacter, Chiu, &
Ochsner, 1993). The storage criterion—for which few ob-
servable correlates were available prior to the advent of
neuroimaging—was initially included in the definition in
deference to Aristotle’s postulate that “nature abhors a
vacuum.”
4 That the content presented to consciousness has a causal
history (e.g., Martin & Deutscher, 1966) is not to imply that
it is identical to its state at acquisition. It is well known that
numerous changes (e.g., addition, subtraction, recombina-
tion) can, and typically do, take place both between and
during encoding and retrieval (e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Nadel &
Moscovitch, 1997). The causal connectivity postulate was
designed to ensure that the intentional object of conscious-
ness—be it memory, imagination, belief, and so on—
maintained some connection to its origin.
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in the preconditions are not in the end product
(i.e., the preconditions offer an “explanation
without remainder;” e.g., Horst, 2007), the ar-
gument that the end product is nothing above
and beyond its preconditions rests on shaky
ground. We have allowed the target of inquiry
to be subsumed by its enablers, thereby confus-
ing the “history of the becoming of a thing with
an analysis of the thing as it has become” (e.g.,
Broad, 1923/1937, p. 12).
By conflating the precursors of an outcome
(e.g., encoding/storage/retrieval) with the out-
come itself (e.g., memory as experienced), we
encourage the practice of seeing the end product
as little more than its preconditions “in dis-
guise.” The danger in so doing is that the con-
struct—intended to provide meaning to the tar-
get of inquiry—is articulated absent essential
features that are present in the end product, but
not in its precursors (for discussion and exam-
ples, see Klein, 2015a).
Explaining too much. “Enthusiasts have
so strained its interpretation as to make it ex-
plain nothing, by reason of the fact that it ex-
plains everything” (Whitehead, 1929, p. 6).
A related concern is that the encoding/
storage/retrieval definition fails to allow distinc-
tions to be drawn between memory and the
other mental states it enables. Encoding, stor-
age, and retrieval play a part in the genesis of a
multitude of mental outcomes. To say of any
one that it is “due to” this processual trio is as
informative as saying “the event of my birth is
a necessary precondition for my ability to
walk.” Although the causal connection between
walking and birth clearly is true, the relation is
informationally anemic: Having been born is a
necessary precondition for everything I have
achieved in life. To avoid explanatory impo-
tency, a criterion must, at a minimum, specify
what it excludes as well as what it includes.
If the term Memory, in virtue of its identifi-
cation with it preconditions, encompasses virtu-
ally everything in the class of mental states,
then it is not a useful distinction among them.
This is not to say that encoding/storage/retrieval
play no part in the production of memorial
experience. Rather, it is to say that memory is
not their inevitable outcome. These same pre-
conditions can (and do) give rise to a variety of
nonmemorial mental states—for example, im-
ages, thoughts, beliefs, fantasies, plans, stereo-
types, attitudes. If we include all mental states
and processes whose origins trace to informa-
tion acquired in one’s past under the heading
Memory, we stretch the concept to the point at
which just about everything we think and do can
be taken as some form of memory. Rather than
asking, “What is memory?” we might be better
served by asking, “What isn’t memory?”
In summary, although simple theories—
because of their greater explanatory power (i.e.,
the principle of parsimony)—are often pre-
ferred to complex ones (e.g., Horst, 2007), a
theory that can explain every outcome does not
explain anything. It is more an act of faith than
of scientific precision. Such is the case with the
encoding/storage/retrieval theory of memory:
Although the experiential terminus of this three-
pronged causal chain can be a memory, it can
also be belief, imagination, knowledge, deci-
sion, judgment, hope, fear, and so on. If this
diversity of phenomena all counts as Memory,
the construct becomes a useless distinction—
trivially true and thus uninformative.
Criteria for a Mental State to Qualify
as Memory
In Klein, (2015c), I argued that the concep-
tual neutering of the construct Memory could be
averted by appreciating that memory entails a
special mode of presentation. Whereas many
mental states derive from past experience, mem-
ory is not just from the past. It is also about the
past (for discussion, see Klein, 2013b). More,
this “aboutness” consists in the feeling that con-
tent retrieved into consciousness refers to events
and experiences from my past. This feeling is
epistemologically and phenomenologically di-
rect. It is not mediated by inference, description,
concepts, rational analysis, or interpretation.
As an example, hearing a tune on the radio
and knowing it is a Beatles song, does not
license the inference that I am having a memory
of the tune. In most cases I simply hear a song
(and know certain facts about it; e.g., its name,
composers, date of composition, and so on). But
I do not hear it as a song I heard previously. I
may know or infer this to be the case, but
typically I do not consider whether my knowl-
edge derives from personal past experience.
By similar reasoning, knowing that my dog’s
name is Cooper is not an act of memory. It is
information presented to consciousness without
any hint of connection with my past. I know his
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name and that is that. Of course this content
(which, on presentation to consciousness has
attained the phenomenological character of
knowledge) was acquired in my past. But reex-
periencing the act of acquisition plays no role in
my phenomenology. And though I may infer
that I learned my dog’s name in the past, this
inference is not concurrent with the content on
presentation.5
Accordingly, memory is not simply from and
about the past. It is from and about my past. Its
mode of presentation entails a direct feeling that
content present in consciousness is about the
past, and that this aboutness is “personally
owned” (e.g., Klein, 2013a, 2015b; Klein &
Nichols, 2012). By personal ownership, I mean
that the content retrieved into consciousness
(i.e., its intentional object) is presented as “an
experience I previously had.” The appropriation
of the content of experience to one’s self is
noninferential and prereflective (e.g., Klein &
Nichols, 2012; Klein, 2015b). It is directly
given to me as “mine.” This possessory custody
can be seen as the “mental glue” that binds
features of retrieved content (its causal connec-
tion to the past and the conscious apprehension
of its pastness) into a feeling that the intentional
object is a reliving of happenings that transpired
previously in my life, a notion to which Tulving
referred as autonoesis (e.g., Tulving, 1985,
2005).
In short, memory is not simply the result of
presenting previously acquired content to con-
sciousness; this is true of many nonmemorial
states. What is critical is the manner in which
retrieved content is presented. To qualify as a
memory, the content must be accompanied by,
or in Locke’s terms, “annexed to” (Locke, 1700/
1975) the feeling that “I originally experienced
this content in the past.” The word “accompa-
nied” highlights recent findings that feelings of
personal ownership are not intrinsic to the in-
tentional object.6 They can, and have been, dis-
sociated, e.g., Klein (2013a), (2014a), (2015b);
Klein and Nichols (2012). The mental states
that result from this interaction are partly deter-
mined by subexperiential activity, but these are
preconditions of the eventual mental state, not
the state itself.
Thus—in contrast to contemporary psycho-
logical and neuroscience doctrine (see Klein,
2015c, Sections 3 and 3.1)—mental states in-
volving knowledge, access to one’s lexicon,
utilization of skills, and so forth, are not acts of
memory. Memory is a term that is (or should
be) reserved for content whose mode of presen-
tation consists in a direct feeling that one is
reliving the circumstances from which that con-
tent was acquired. Although the pastness of a
mental state may be identified by conceptual or
inferential analysis of retrieved content (e.g., “I
attended a Jimi Hendrix concert when I was in
high school. Since I attended high school in the
1960s, I know the concert was in the past”),
such analyses do not justify the ascription of the
term Memory. (“Despite this knowledge, I no
longer am able to re-live the experience.”)
Memory is an experience. To experience a
memory is to have an immediate, nonanalytic
feeling that my current mental state is cotermi-
nous with a state of affairs I experienced in the
past. This is accomplished by several individu-
ally necessary and (possibly) jointly sufficient
criteria: (a) There is a causal connection be-
tween content presented to consciousness and
the past, (b) content retrieved into conscious-
ness is taken as its intentional object, (c) there is
a feeling of pastness accompanying the inten-
tional object, (d) this feeling is noninferential
and prereflective, and (e) the past to which the
intentional object is annexed is directly felt as
“mine” (i.e., personally owned, or, in James’,
1890, more colorful terms, accompanied by
feelings of warmth and intimacy).
So What, If Anything, Among the Offerings
of Contemporary Memory Research,
Qualifies as Memory?
Based on the writings of contemporary
scholars, the construct Memory encompasses
a diverse collection of exemplars and types.
Tulving (2007), only partly tongue-in-cheek
(personal communication; 9/20/2017), has
counted 256 variants, most of which are
framed in terms of the specific tasks used in
5 I am well aware that the above examples fulfill the
criteria for the knowledge subtype of the semantic memory
system. However, as argued in Klein (2015c), there are no
conceptual arguments or empirical grounds that sanction
ascription of the term “memory” to acts of knowing (or
skills), but not to the (many) nonmemorial states (e.g.,
beliefs, attitudes, goals) similarly rooted in my past.
6 X is an intrinsic property of Y if Y’s having the property
X does not consist in Y also having a relation, Z, to
something else.
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their investigation (see also Roediger, Marsh,
& Lee, 2002). Among this fractious cohort, one
variant—episodic memory—comes closest to
satisfying the criteria enumerated in the previ-
ous section.
Unfortunately—like its parent category—
episodic memory admits to an assortment of
definitions, verbal manifestations, and neuro-
anatomical correlates (for review, see Klein,
2013a, 2015c; Michaelian, & Sutton, 2017).
The account corresponding most closely to
the ideas expressed herein is presented in
Klein (2013a). This version adheres closely to
Tulving’s post-1984 conception of episodic
memory (e.g., Tulving, 1985, 1993, 2005),
with a few emendations. The most important,
for our purposes, is that the properties accom-
panying episodic memory (e.g., subjective
temporality, personal ownership) are attrib-
uted to operations acting on system-neutral
content retrieved into consciousness (see next
section), rather than to qualities intrinsic to
content stored in a system dedicated to epi-
sodic memory.7
Situating Memory in the Mind and
in Nature
Thus far I have focused on one particular
mental phenomenon—that of memory. But the
principles educed in Klein (2015c) apply more
broadly. In what follows, I outline a general
theory of a specific operation of the mind—the
translation of learned content into conscious
experience. Although much of what I have to
say is a straightforward expansion of arguments
from the preceding sections, I think it helpful to
make these points explicit.
Few memory researchers take issue with the
proposition that expressions of learning—
behaviorally or as an object of consciousness—
qualify as memory (for discussion, see Klein,
2015c). However, this relation is defensible
only if one accepts the additional proposition
that memory consists in any mental or behav-
ioral occurrence whose genesis traces to an act
of learning. As I argued in the previous section,
however, while learning is a necessary precon-
dition for memory, memory is not the inescap-
able consequence of learning (a similar view is
voiced by Ribot, 1882).
Memory and the Mind: Learned Content Is
State-Agnostic Prior to Its Presentation
to Consciousness
Contemporary treatments of the difference
between learning and memory seldom stray far
from the rather pedestrian insight that learning
addresses change whereas memory is concerned
with something that happens after a change. The
goal of the present section is to show that a
more fine-tuned distinction between learning
and memory has important consequences for
how we view the workings of the mind. In the
section “Remembering With and Without
Memory,” I discuss the implications of this dis-
tinction for terminology used to describe those
workings.
Although expressions of learning need not
involve consciousness (habits, well-practiced
skills, etc.; e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1979), in what
follows, I restrict discussion to those that do.
Learned content, prior to its experiential real-
ization, is state-agnostic. It may be recruited in
the service of belief, memory, judgment, knowl-
edge, goals, thought, imagery, actions, skills,
and so forth, but it does not exist as such until it
becomes an intentional object under a particular
mode of presentation (for argument and evi-
dence, see Klein, 2015c, 2016a).
This is not to say there are no neural modules
with modality-specific content at the subexpe-
riential level (e.g., Fodor, 1983). It is to say that
there are no subexperiential modules dedicated
to the storage, maintenance, and utilization of
mental traits and faculties. Most of these ac-
quire their psychological character from the
manner in which state-agnostic content is con-
joined at retrieval with various motives and
procedures to secure a particular mode of pre-
sentation. Depending on context and circum-
stance, the same content can be experienced as
imagination, memory, attitude, belief, thought,
and so forth.
For example, suppose the content I retrieve is
a mental image of Jimi Hendrix holding his
7 Kriegel (2015) recently voiced a similar view: “There is
a feeling of pastness associated with episodic memory, but
it is built into its attitudinal nature; it does not appear to be
at the level of content” (p. 410).
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Fender Stratocaster.8 This content may be ex-
perienced as an image (tout court), a desire
(e.g., I wish I owned a Fender Stratocaster),
knowledge (e.g., his full name is James Maurice
Hendrix), fantasy (I am playing second lead
guitar in “The Jimi Hendrix Experience”),
memory (I am reliving the time I saw Hendrix
play at Woolsey Hall in New Haven), and so
forth. In short, prior to being associated with a
particular mode of presentation, remembered
content remains agnostic with regard to the phe-
nomenological character it will assume after
being taken as the intentional object of con-
sciousness.9
In summary, although learning and memory
often are treated as the unavoidable endpoints of
an unbroken causal chain, learning is a neces-
sary condition for an act of memory, but not
sufficient. There is no memory until content is
made available to, and apprehended by, con-
sciousness under a particular mode of presenta-
tion. That is, memory is an experience (although
there are a number of subexperiential precondi-
tions that enable its experiential realization—e.g.,
see Table 1, Item 2). In this sense, the com-
monly held assumption that there are subexpe-
riential systems capable of being designated as
memory (or desire, or attitude, etc.) is called
into question.10
Memory: Natural and Human Kinds
Natural kinds are objects or groupings that
reflect real distinctions in nature. They are char-
acterized by an ontological stability that renders
them independent of the categorizations or the
descriptions they are given. Human kinds, in
contrast, are not independent of their categori-
zation. Their reality maps to the words used to
describe them rather than to things in them-
selves. Unlike natural kinds, human kinds are
subject to changes in character as a result of
changes in the language used in their classifi-
cation (for discussions, see Hacking, 1992; Tay-
lor, 1985).
In Klein (2015c) I attempted to make the case
that memory is a natural rather than a human
kind. One of my arguments—the stability of
usage—received only oblique mention. In what
follows, I draw out more fully the implications
of that aspect of my argument for the natural-
kind status of memory.
Experiential Constancy as a Criterion for
Natural-Kind Status
The view of memory as “content conjoined
with a non-inferential feeling of the past as my
past” has, at least until recently, a long history
in Western thought, tracing to Greek antiquity
(reviewed in Klein, 2015c). Over the millennia,
the experience of reliving events from one’s
past has been firmly entrenched as part of hu-
man subjective reality (which, in contrast to
many in the field, I take to be a part of nature:
e.g., Klein, 2016b). Memory, so conceived,
does not exist only in some particular cultural
context at some particular time.
However, although long-held beliefs about a
construct do not usually ensure they capture the
natural order (the earth, after all, was believed
by many to be the center of the universe for
thousands of years), in the domain of personal
phenomenology, stability can confer ontologi-
cal warrant. Apprehension of an intentional ob-
ject of consciousness—rather than that to which
the object refers—is an introspectively given
state whose mode of presentation is made fully
visible in and by the experience itself: Interpre-
tation of that to which the object refers may be
inaccurate (e.g., despite our personal phenome-
nology, the sun does not travel around the
earth), but the interpreter cannot be mistaken
about how the intentional object appears (e.g.,
Gertler, 2011; Shoemaker, 1968). The special
epistemic character of first person, present tense
8 Although I have chosen a fixed image for my example,
nothing turns on this stasis. Whether retrieved content is
static or dynamic, the same general principles obtain.
9 To avoid potential confusion, let me be clear that the
individuation of a mental state as, say, a memory, knowl-
edge, fantasy, or belief is a function of a variety of factors,
including, but not limited to, scientific consensus on lan-
guage used in their characterization, and the nature of the
intentional object and the type of (largely subexperiential)
routines enacted on the intentional object. Personal owner-
ship enables one to experience possessory custody of a
mental state: It is not a determining factor in the type of
state experienced.
10 A similar view of mind and memory is found in Rus-
sell (1921). For example, “Memory-images and imagination
images do not differ in their intrinsic qualities, so far as we
can discover. They differ by the fact that the images that
constitute memories, unlike those that constitute imagina-
tion, are accompanied by a feeling of belief which may be
expressed in the words ‘this happened’. The mere occur-
rence of images, without this feeling of belief, constitutes
imagination.” (p. 176).
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Table 1
Notes on Some Key Terms Used in This Paper
Terms and definitions
In Table 1, I spell out my intended meaning of terms that play a central role in this paper. My reasons for doing so are
two-fold. First, many of these are terms from highly specialized areas of philosophy (e.g., mind, phenomenology,
science). Because they are unlikely to be familiar to readers not involved in those research domains, explicit
specification of my (perhaps idiosyncratic) usage seems warranted.
Second, some of these terms have several (colloquially accepted) uses (e.g., experience, mind, content); accordingly, a
precise treatment of their in-text sense establishes a common reference base. Although not everyone will agree with
my definitions, there should be little question of the meanings I intend.
1. Consciousness: Consciousness comes in many kinds (e.g., sentience, access consciousness, noetic consciousness,
temporal consciousness, phenomenal consciousness; e.g., Klein, 2012). My use of the term consists in the proposition
that X is conscious if and only if there is something it is like for the organism to be in that state (e.g., Nagel, 1974).
That is, consciousness enables first-person experience (see Item 4). This usage is what most philosophers have in
mind when discussing phenomenal consciousness.
2. Mental state: X is a mental state only if and only if it there is “something it is like” for the organism to have the
mental state. A mental state contains both content (e.g., objects of consciousness) as well as qualitative (i.e., the
subjective feel of the content) aspects. It is thus the experiential (see Item 4) outcome of a process (or set of
processes) that can have non-experiential aspects. Although these nonexperiential preconditions are necessary for
realizing the mental state, they are nonmental in the sense that they are mechanisms that help make experience
possible, but are not the experience per se—that is, as it is felt. They conceivably could go on without there being
any experience. An analogy may help: A play consists in a great deal of behind-the-scenes activity (e.g., funding,
auditions, permits), but, strictly speaking, none of this activity is the play per se. All mental states are experiential in
the sense described in Item 4.
Important note: In this paper I restrict usage of the mental state to situations in which the intentional object refers to
content retrieved into consciousness. The term is not meant to refer to circumstances in which the intentional object
originates from an occurrent act of perception or sensation, though, in actuality, mental state describes equally well
both situations. My motivation for selective application is not based on theory or convention. Rather, it is done for
expository convenience (the arguments I present in the text pertain only to the former usage).
3. Mind: Mind is the collection of subexperiential processes required for having a mental state, in addition to the mental
states they enable.
4. Experience: Experience is the qualitative aspect of the mental states you are having right now. Although experience is
what most philosophers have in mind when they talk about consciousness, in my usage, consciousness must be
accompanied by an intentional object (see Item 6) to produce subjective experience. Accordingly, all experience is
conscious experience. Although some who use the term “experience” have “sensation” in mind (e.g., pain) and perception
(e.g., that tree over there), experience, as I use the term, can take as its intentional object (see Item 6) such things as
thought, belief, memory and other mental content. In this way, experience can be cognitive as well as sensory.
5. Experience and feeling: Although some philosophers hold that a feeling is an additional mental item accompanying
the experienced content of a mental state, for my purposes nothing substantive rides on this distinction. Accordingly,
when I use the term “feeling” I refer to the qualitative mode in which a mental state is apprehended. In my sense, all
experience is felt—i.e., it is the particular “what it is like-ness” of the mental state you are having right now.
6. Mental content, intentional objects, and mode of presentation: A distinction can (and should) be drawn between the
intentional objects of consciousness and the content to which those objects refer or are directed. Content refers to any
neurally realized material of interoceptive or exteroceptive origin (after initial registration, this material often undergoes
extensive reworking; e.g., Bartlett, 1932). When presented to consciousness, content becomes its intentional object. The
intentional object refers to the proposition that all conscious experiences have objects (i.e., content) to which they refer—
that is, they are about something (e.g., Brentano, 1995; Smith, 1989). Thus, although every conscious experience takes
some content as its intentional object, not all content is realized as an intentional object (e.g., it becomes an intentional
object if and only if it is presented to consciousness. Otherwise it exists solely in a nonexperiential property of mind).
The way in which content is presented to consciousness is referred to as the content’s mode of presentation, which is
determined by the content presented to consciousness in addition to the manner in which that content is characterized (i.e.,
its phenomenological sense). For instance, depending on the mode of presentation, the same content can be taken by
consciousness as a memory, belief, knowledge, precept, etc. In the case of memory, mode of presentation (i.e., subjective
colouring) derives from two related, but independent, sources: (a) The content taken as the intentional object of
consciousness is felt to be a direct, noninferential reexperiencing of the past (subjective past temporality), and (b) the
feeling of personal ownership—i.e., the occurrences and experiences reflected by the intentional object happened to me in
my past. The claim of independence is secured by findings that individuals can (a) experience past-oriented subjective
temporality absent a feeling of personal ownership (e.g., Klein, 2013a, 2016a; Klein & Nichols, 2012), and (b) experience
personal ownership absent a feeling of temporal reference (e.g., Klein, 2014b, 2016a; Klein & Steindam, 2016).
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psychological statements is typically referred to
as immunity to error through misidentification
(IEM).
The psychological topography of our men-
tal constructs ultimately must be fitted to
first-person acquaintance with the experien-
tial acts in which they are realized (e.g., Gal-
lagher, & Zahavi, 2008; Strawson, 2009). A
conceptualization of personal experience
drawn entirely in analytic way is a discourse
about experience, not a rendering of the ex-
perience (e.g., Georgalis, 2006; Varela,
Thompson, & Rosch, 1993).
In contrast to the stability of reports concern-
ing the experience of memory, many of our
mental traits and faculties—for example, moti-
vation, consciousness, self, personality, depres-
sion, attitudes—have been subject to consider-
able revision and reconsideration over the
millennia (e.g., Danziger, 1997; Uttal, 2001).
These variations derive primarily from schol-
arly negotiations embedded within particular
cultural contexts. As Danziger observes, “the
categories one meets in psychological texts are
discursive categories, forms of words, not the
things themselves” (1997, p. 186). And when
categorizations change as a function of histori-
cal context, the suspicion arises that a con-
struct’s meaning is being negotiated and rene-
gotiated by groups to whom it matters (e.g.,
Wittgenstein, 1997) – that is, description is
more an act of construction than of discovery.
In short, the act of categorizing mental phe-
nomena can (and typically does) vary as a func-
tion of specific discursive practices. Indeed, it is
a live question whether persons untutored in the
psychological and philosophical dogma of their
time would find experiential grounds for distin-
guishing between mental states such as knowl-
edge, belief, and faith.
An exception to this view of mental traits and
faculties as a discursive categories is memory.
Historical and phenomenological evidence sug-
gest the temporal and cultural stability of the
construct (as used herein) captures a clearly
delimited aspect of human nature—one whose
experiential description maps to something that
exists independently of the language used to
describe it. Although stability is no guarantee of
natural kind status, in the context of mental
phenomena, consistency of usage provides good
reason to believe we are closer to cutting nature
at an ontological seam than we are for the more
labile constructs that populate contemporary
mental topographies.
Remembering With and Without Memory
In 1965 Rozeboom argued for a “wholesale
re-examination and tightening up of how we
think about psychological phenomena” (p.
330; emphasis in original). To this end, he
presented an analysis of the concept “mem-
ory” as well as a grammatical examination of
its cognates. Based on his analyses, he con-
cluded that
our propensity for thinking in loose metaphors when
we should be trying for carefully wrought sentences
that say precisely what we want them to say too often
fogs our recognition of the very technical details that
Table 1 (continued)
Terms and definitions
7. Precondition: I occasionally talk about nonmental preconditions (e.g., the operations of encoding, storage, and
retrieval). These preconditions, though necessary for a mental state (see Item 2), are not sufficient for its realization.
They are “building blocks” that can, when combined in the proper manner with a particular subjective context (e.g.,
temporally propertied and personally owned) eventuate in a particular mental state (e.g., a memory).
The building-block metaphor may help unpack my intended meaning. Encoding, storage and retrieval (to use memory
as my example) can be viewed as the building blocks that, when conjoined with the proper “instructions” (internal or
external context; preexisting neural pathways, etc.) and subjective feelings of pastness, result in a memorial
experience. But these building blocks, are no more memory than a collection of building material and a set of
blueprints is a house. Under different circumstances (different contexts, different plans, and so on) they can be used
to construct any number of mental and non-mental outcomes. They are necessary, not sufficient.
8. Presuppositions in science: Presuppositions are widely held, but largely unexamined, beliefs about a construct. These
beliefs often play a substantial role in determining the questions we ask nature, but they are not facts or truths
discovered in virtue of critical analyses of the answers we receive. Some presuppositions may facilitate the
performance of scientific inquiry, but what is important to note is that they are not formally part of science.
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are most seminal for further research and theory. (Ro-
zeboom, 1965; p. 363)11
It is not my intent to review Rozeboom’s
work or to compare his ideas with mine (where
points of contact exist, we are in general agree-
ment). Rather, I draw on the ideas outlined in
the present article to show that the technical
language used to investigate and describe mem-
ory phenomena often has considerably less to
do with memory than is appreciated by memory
research.12
In what follows, I focus on the use of the
cognate “remember.” Among memory scholars,
“remember”, first and foremost, is a specific
expression of the more general process of “re-
trieval” featured in the 3-pronged definition of
memory. “Remember” is treated as an achieve-
ment verb (it also can take noun form; Binnick,
1991) used to designate something subject X
does to content Y. Specifically, “X remembers
Y” (e.g., that Hartford is the capital of Connect-
icut; that I ate steak for dinner). And, of defi-
nitional necessity, the experiential terminus of
this doing is having a memory. The idea that “to
remember is to retrieve memories” is so deeply
engrained in the technical language of memory
(cf., Mace, 2010) that it essentially is taken as
axiomatic.
But, scientific presuppositions, however
firmly rooted in thought, language and practice,
are not inviolable laws: They are postulates that
color how we think about nature, not how na-
ture itself is constituted. As Rescher (1984)
observes, they are “a matter of the particular
systematization of knowledge we find it conve-
nient to adopt.” (p. 11). The sense and reference
of the word “remember” – like all memory-
words—requires an explicit, rigorous account.
Only in this way can we determine the extent to
which research on memory “substantiates, re-
fines, repudiates or is otherwise relevant to”
(Rozeboom, 1965, p. 332) our presuppositions.
Considered in the context of arguments I
have presented, contemporary treatments of “re-
member” confuse the act of remembering with
the object remembered. This confusion is the
predictable consequence of the (often tacit) pre-
supposition that “remember” and “memory” are
inseparably yoked as process and product. But,
as I have argued, remembering does not imply
that retrieved content necessarily will result in
memorial experience. Although remembering
makes content originating from past experience
available, that content remains state-neutral un-
til it assumes a particular mode of presentation.
And that mode does not have to be the feeling
that I am reexperiencing something that hap-
pened to me in my past. It can be experienced as
a host of mental states, which though having a
causal connection to something that happened
to me in my past, is not accompanied by the
feeling that I am reliving a past happening. For
the outcome of remembering to be memory, the
something that happened to me in my past must
be descriptive both of the source of the inten-
tional object and its mode of presentation.
For example, I can remember knowledge
(e.g., the song on the radio is a Beatle’s song; I
was born in New York), belief (e.g., Jenny is the
school’s smartest student; the earth is flat), facts
(e.g., 2  2  4; the sun is approximately 93
million miles from the earth), rules (e.g., a red
traffic light means stop; in chess, the bishop
moves diagonally), skills (e.g., how to ride a
bike; how to play a song on piano). Although
each of these intentional objects results from an
act of remembering, none, with respect to the
ideas presented in this article, is an example of
the construct Memory.
I briefly summarize my position. According
to the “received view,” remembering is a pro-
cess in which content retrieved from storage
culminates in a memorial experience. In con-
trast, the position I take—which is a logical
consequence of my theory of memory and
mind—is that, although all memory requires
remembering, not all remembering eventuates
in memory. To remember means nothing more
than that state-agnostic content has been made
available as an intentional object consciousness
under a particular mode of presentation (be it
11 At the time of its publication, Rozeboom anticipated
his attempt to diagnose and unravel some of the conceptual
confusion attending the word memory would be met with
“indifference, incomprehension, and at times open hostil-
ity.” (Rozeboom, 1965; p. 329). Unfortunately, his expec-
tation proved prescient: In the 53 years following publica-
tion, his article has been cited only 22 times (four in the past
25 years).
12 I was not aware of Rozeboom’s work when I wrote my
paper “What memory is” (Klein, 2015c). In light of my
discovery, I now view my paper, in part, as a long-overdue
attempt to call attention to the important message that
Rozeboom predicted, with sad accuracy, would be met with
indifference.
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memory, belief, attitude, imagination, skill,
etc.).
Do Amnesic Patients Know Their
Own Experiences?
Unless a proposal can be shown to have con-
sequences for how we think about and conduct
research, it runs the risk of being little more
than a squabble over semantics. In this regard, a
case can be made that my analysis of the con-
struct Remember is more a philosophical exer-
cise than a scientific proposal.
A comprehensive review of the ways in
which my construal of memory can provide a
new and fruitful perspective on issues of long-
standing debate in memory research would take
me well beyond my page limits (see Klein,
2015c for review). I do, however, want to dis-
cuss the implications of my reconceptualization
of Remember for one of the more curious phe-
nomena in memory studies—the finding that
amnesic patients often demonstrate intact learn-
ing despite an avowed absence of memorial
experience.
Consider, as our example, the case of patient
H. M.13 As a result of a surgical resection of his
medial temporal lobes, H. M. was rendered pro-
foundly amnesic for events experienced follow-
ing his procedure (Scoville & Milner, 1957).
Certain aspects of H. M.’s amnesia, however,
presented a problem for memory theorists: De-
spite stating that he lacked memory for any
events encountered postsurgically, H. M. none-
theless was able to learn new things (for re-
views, see Corkin, 2002; Rosenbaum, Murphy,
& Rich, 2012). The contrast between H. M.’s
anterograde amnesia and his spared learning (as
evidenced by performance of newly acquired
behaviors) presented a dilemma—how could
H. M. remember how to execute newly acquired
behaviors if he had no memories related to
them? These findings were particularly vexing,
given the deeply held conviction that “to re-
member is to have a memory.” Clearly, some-
thing was seriously amiss.
An answer began to take form by the early
1970s (e.g., Warrington, & Weiskrantz, 1970).
Influenced by the conceptual resources made
available by then current philosophical treat-
ment of memory as consisting in multiple, func-
tionally independent systems (for review, see
Klein, 2015c), the dissociation between H. M.’s
absence of memorial experience and his intact
learning ability could be accounted for by the
idea that (a) memory exists in a variety of types,
(b) the availability of different types of memory
can explain performance on different types of
tasks (e.g., semantic memory explains how he
learns new facts; procedural memory explains
how he learns new skills; implicit memory ex-
plains how he learns to solve priming tasks;
e.g., Corkin, 2002; O’Kane, Kensinger, & Cor-
kin, 2004; Schmolck, Kensinger, Corkin, &
Squire, 2002), and (c) only the type of memory
accompanied by a feeling of reliving (i.e., epi-
sodic) was impacted by his surgical procedure.
But how does this explain the apparent unre-
liability of H. M.’s introspective reports (i.e.,
his claim that he has no memory of X despite
the ability to perform tasks whose execution
requires remembering information about X)?
Isn’t uncorrupted access to one’s subjectivity
guaranteed by IEM?
The explanation was quite simple. H. M.’s
faulty reports are not a result of a corruption of
introspection, but rather result from terminolog-
ical ignorance of the “fact” that many forms of
memory do not entail a feeling of reexperienc-
ing. H. M. and patients like him need to update
their criteria for deciding which experiential
states count as a memory.
Contemporary memory theorists have al-
most universally embraced this explanation of
amnesic dissociative behavior (for reviews,
see Campbell & Conway, 1995; Cermak,
1982; Mayes, 1988; but see Toth & Hunt,
1999). However, I believe a more parsimoni-
ous account of is possible. My explanation
trades in the construal of remembering as a
process in which state-neutral content is made
available to consciousness under a particular
mode of presentation, only one of which cul-
minates in memorial experience (see previous
section). From this vantage point, a patient’s
behavior and subjective experience march in
lockstep: As a consequence of neural insult,
content still can be remembered and made
13 H. M simply is one example of the widely recognized
phenomenon of amnesic learning in the absence of memory
for the experiences from which that learning was acquired.
I did not originally feel it necessary to note the generality of
the phenomenon; but because a reviewer questioned the
inferential warrant of “relying on N  1,” I now do so to
avoid confusion on the part of other readers.
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available for task performance, but the con-
tent is experienced as something other than
memory. Its phenomenological character is
determined by context and the results of dis-
cursive practices of specialized groups for
whom these constructs play a role, for exam-
ple, as knowledge, fact, belief, intuition, skill.
Seen thus, it is the memory scholar’s crite-
ria—not the patient’s—in need of revision.
Final Thoughts
All the world over and at all times there have been
practical men, absorbed in ‘irreducible and stubborn
facts’; all the world over and at all times there have
been men of philosophic temperament, who have
been absorbed in the weaving of general principles.
It is this union of passionate interest in the detailed facts
with equal devotion to abstract generalisation which
forms the novelty of our present society. (Whitehead,
1926, p. 3)
The proper way to use technical language is
to do so knowingly—that is, to conduct a rig-
orous and carefully delineated examination of
the sense and reference of our constructs prior
to pushing them into investigative service. Only
in this way can we hope to make progress
toward determining whether the data we collect
refer to things that exist in nature or to things
whose existence is contingent on linguistic
practices negotiated by the scientific commu-
nity.
In this paper, I argued that a sustained con-
ceptual analysis of memory and its cognates is
seldom found in the psychological and neuro-
scientific literatures. Rather, professional under-
standing of these constructs is underwritten by a
jumble of folk-psychological presupposition
and scientific thought, whose proportions one
can only guess. Although I have no way to tell
whether my efforts to fill this conceptual void
have positioned us on a path to genuine under-
standing, one thing is certain: Until we fully
embrace the need for a more critical attitude
toward our constructs, psychology’s claim to
being a science will remain an assertion in need
of defense rather than one of unquestioned ac-
ceptance.14
14 In the service of full transparency, this final line is a
paraphrase of a quote of which I am particularly fond but
whose source I no longer remember.
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